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Traditional economic theory posits that a well-functioning capital market is a necessary condition for 
industrialization and economic growth. In reality, micro and small enterprises are ubiquitous because 
entrepreneurs can undertake low-return activities with minimal barriers to entry. Using a cashmere 
sweater cluster in China as an example, this paper shows that organizational choice can overcome the 
prohibitive cost of investment. When facing credit constraints, firms are more likely to concentrate in 
divisible production technologies in the form of industrial clusters. Within clusters, a vertically-integrated 
production process can be decomposed into many small incremental stages that are more accessible for 
the small entrepreneurs widely available in rural China, thereby supporting industrialization even in the 
absence of a well-functioning capital market. The observed rate of returns to capital is closely related to 
the organizational choice under credit constraints.  
Keywords: cluster; putting-out; subcontract; industrialization; entrepreneurship; China 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, China has experienced the same degree of industrialization that took two 
centuries to occur in Europe (Summers, 2007). When China started its reforms in the early 1980s, rural 
areas and farmers lacked financial services, meaning that most small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
lacked access to formal credit (Lin and Li, 2001). Traditional economic theory posits that a well-
functioning capital market is a necessary condition for industrialization and economic growth (Goldsmith, 
1969; McKinnon, 1973; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 
Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2006). In theory, China’s lack of financial development 
during the initial stage of industrialization should have prevented investments in machinery and other 
assets required for nonfarm production. However, vast rural areas in coastal China became industrialized 
at an unprecedented speed and now produce a wide range of manufactured goods. This begs the question: 
How did SMEs in China get around the credit constraints and launch their businesses?  
Empirical studies suggest that entrepreneurs in emerging markets can start out with little capital 
and invest their profits for further growth (Mead and Liedholm, 1998; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). 
The studies find that micro and small enterprises are ubiquitous because entrepreneurs can undertake low-
return activities with minimum barriers to entry. These studies also identify a large variation in capital 
entry barriers across sectors. For example, there is a hurdle in the range of $1,000 to $2,000 in the 
manufacturing sector in Mexico, whereas the barriers to entry in the service and trade sectors of this 
country are much lower (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). Based on manufacturing surveys in several 
African countries, Bergsten et al. (2000) also find that African firms face high capital costs in the 
manufacturing sector. Although these studies show that entrepreneurs can start small in activities 
requiring small investments, they cannot rule out the possibility that high start-up costs may prevent small 
firms from growing in the manufacturing sector. Since the development of a manufacturing sector is 
crucial to the process of industrialization, more in-depth case studies are needed to examine whether or 
not capital barriers to entry have a threshold effect (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). 
China’s rapid industrialization provides an unparalleled opportunity to examine this issue. One 
key feature of China’s industrialization is that it is cluster-based, and has been driven by a large number 
of SMEs (Long and Zhang, 2008). Contrary to traditional theory, this suggests that capital barriers might 
have not prevented entrepreneurs from setting up businesses in the manufacturing sector. Without 
denying the importance of financial development, this paper uses a cashmere sweater cluster in China as 
an example, and argues that organizational choice can largely overcome the prohibitive cost of 
investment. Facing credit constraints, firms are more likely to concentrate in divisible production 
technologies and form industrial clusters. Within clusters, a vertically-integrated production process can 
be decomposed into many small incremental stages that are more accessible to the small entrepreneurs 
widely available in rural China, thereby supporting industrialization even in the absence of a well-
functioning capital market.  
This paper first posits the theoretical model that credit constraints influence entrepreneurs’ 
technological choices. In the absence of outside credit, entrepreneurs must rely on their own savings. As 
their savings increase, they choose increasingly capital-intensive, more profitable production 
technologies. Because potential entrepreneurs with more financial resources always have the option to 
invest in less-expensive technologies, it is expected that the rate of returns to capital will be positively 
correlated to the minimum level of investment of a chosen production technology, as predicted by the 
Baumol hypothesis (Baumol, 1959). In reality, once a business reaches a certain size, banks grow willing 
to provide outside capital based on the enterprise’s available collateral. With more capital available from 
this point forward, larger firms expand with diminishing returns to capital. This model suggests that there 
is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between rate of returns to capital and capital stock.  
In the cashmere sweater cluster, there are two different production technologies. Larger firms 
with access to outside credit are more likely to choose the more capital-intensive, vertically-integrated 
factory system, where most stages of production are managed within one organization. Most 2 
 
entrepreneurs with limited savings, in contrast, lean toward independent workshops or small enterprises 
that are part of a merchant-coordinated putting-out system. The capital requirement for most of the 
divisible production technologies in a putting-out system is significantly lower than that for an integrated 
factory system. In terms of performance, empirical results based on primary surveys in the cashmere 
sweater cluster show that as the average capital stock employed increases, profitability increases up to a 
maximum, and then declines progressively thereafter.  
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the available literature and puts forward a 
theoretical model on credit constraints, organizational choice and returns to capital. Section 3 presents a 
narrative of the Puyuan cluster and the major modes of production. Section 4 describes the data and 
provides summary statistics. Section 5 estimates the relationship between rate of returns to capital and 




2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Recent studies find that financial development is related to the organizational choice of production. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2007) argue that when the capital market is well developed, firms are 
more likely to be vertically integrated, in order to take advantage of economies of scale. In countries 
where the financial market is well developed, population density is low, and labor cost is high, 
entrepreneurs tend to invest in larger, more profitable factory systems that are normally capital intensive. 
This is why vertically-integrated firms are more popular in the US than elsewhere. However, in some 
countries where population density is much higher and the capital market is well functioning (such as 
Japan and Italy), the clustering (or subcontracting) mode of production is seen alongside the integrated 
factory system (Piore and Sabel, 1984).  
This paper focuses on the initial stage of industrialization, when credit constraints are a major 
concern (Freedman and Click, 2006). The prior findings on the relationship between financial 
development and organizational production choices are mixed. On one hand, some studies argue that 
large, integrated firms are more likely to be observed because small enterprises cannot be launched in the 
absence of credit (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). On the other hand, McKenze and Woodruff (2006) posit 
that entrepreneurs facing credit constraints tend to choose activities that require minimal capital, favoring 
the establishment of micro and small enterprises.  
The development of financial systems capable of extending credit to SMEs has been widely 
called for in both theory and policy (Murdoch, 1999). However, despite noted successes, such as the 
microfinance programs in some developing countries, SMEs in these countries generally still have more 
difficulty obtaining low-interest loans compared to large firms, for several reasons. First, because the cost 
of managing a bank account is largely fixed, a small loan commands relatively higher transaction costs 
than a large loan. This reduces the incentives of formal banks to provide small loans to SMEs. Second, 
information asymmetries may discourage banks from extending credit to SMEs. These information 
problems are typically associated with inconsistencies in the financial statements of SMEs and the lack of 
third party credit information providers in the marketplace. Finally, the inability of SMEs to provide 
collateral and build borrowing relationships with banks exacerbates the information problem and the 
resulting credit rationing. In short, the path to industrialization via financial development seems like a 
daunting task.  
Here, we argue that there could be an alternative path through organizational choices of 
production. If a production technology can be broken into many small steps through organizational 
innovations, such as the putting-out system or subcontracting, it should be possible for many 
entrepreneurs with limited capital and minimal access to credit to participate in the production process. 
This approach has been largely neglected in the literature, with a few exceptions (Leff, 1978; Hayami, 
1998).  
To illustrate this point, we next develop a theoretical model. Following the classical model of 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) (called the ‘EJ model’ hereafter), we assume an entrepreneur’s revenue as： 
   
 k y   (1) 
where θ is a technology parameter, k is capital investment for a project, α is capital-output elasticity, and ε 
is a random term. Unlike the EJ model, we do not consider entrepreneurial talents in our model.  
Suppose that that an entrepreneur’s initial wealth is z. If the required investment, k, is greater than 
z, then the entrepreneur needs to borrow from outside with an interest rate of r. If we ignore the random 
term ε, then the entrepreneur’s profit equation can be written as: 
  () () y rk z k rk z
       (2) 
Under the risk-natural assumption, the entrepreneur will make an investment to maximize his profit as 
shown in (2). The interior solution, if it exists, will satisfy the following first-order condition: 4 
 
 






Similar to the EJ model, we also write the maximum amount of investment an entrepreneur can mobilize 
as λz, where   measures the degree of capital market development. The more developed the capital 
market, the larger . We then introduce the minimal capital investment,  b K , for the production 
technology. For an investment to be viable, the optimal investment must meet the following condition: 
 
* [,] b KK z    (4) 
A potential entrepreneur with initial wealth z may face three choices depending upon his wealth level: (1) 
If his total available capital is lower than the entry barrier ( b zK   ), he will not be able to enter the 
business. (2) If his mobilized capital is larger than the minimal required investment, but below the optimal 
point (
*
b Kz K  ), he will make an investment but not at the optimal amount he wishes. (3) If his 
available capital exceeds the optimal investment point (
* z K   ), he will choose
* K . 
Now we consider how capital market development influences entrepreneurs’ investment choice. 
Let us use λ1 and λ2 to represent the cases of well-developed and less-developed capital markets. The 
horizontal axis lists the potential entrepreneurs’ levels of initial assets. The bottom part of the figure 
represents the density distribution of entrepreneurs with different amounts of capital. The actual 
investment amounts can be seen on the vertical axis above the horizontal axis.  
As shown in Figure 1, when the capital market is well developed (λ1), the potential entrepreneurs 
shown on the right hand side of   can overcome the minimal capital requirement, Kb. Entrepreneurs 
with wealth is equal to or greater than  choose the optimal level of investment,
* K . However, 
when the capital market is less developed (λ2), only individuals whose assets are no less than   will 
become entrepreneurs, and only those few people having wealth above a very high level of  will 
be able to make the optimal investment. Fewer entrepreneurs will be able to invest in this case compared 
to the first case, and most entrepreneurs are credit constrained. According to this model, an improvement 
in the financial market (change from λ2 to λ1) will enable many potential entrepreneurs with assets 
between   and   to become entrepreneurs.  
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In reality, when facing the prohibitively high entry barrier of a production process, entrepreneurs 
may choose an alternative path by decomposing the process into many small incremental steps, through 
organizational innovations such as clustering, thereby lowering the minimum capital requirement. Recent 
case studies in China provide strong evidence for the role of clustering in overcoming capital barriers to 
entry (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009). Let us use Figure 2 to illustrate this point. Suppose an 
integrated production technology Tech2 can be decomposed into many incremental steps, one of which is 
Tech1. Because of the rather low entry barrier for Tech1, even in the presence of a less-developed financial 
market (λ2), many people can still become entrepreneurs by investing in Tech1.  
We now more rigorously formalize the idea behind Figure 2 to examine the relationship between 
technology choice and profitability in the presence of credit constraints. We write the profit of the two 
production technologies as: 
  () ii i i kr k z
     (5) 
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Figure 2. Entry barriers and entrepreneurial choice of production types 
 
In many developing countries, the micro and small enterprises are often credit constrained. 
Because of their limited capital availability, most of them fail to achieve the optimal level of investment. 
Their investment level is in proportion to their wealth level, as shown by the line of   in Figure 2. 
For technology i, the rate of returns to capital equals： 
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i
i
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   
 (6) 
where  . Under the assumption of α , the following holds: 
 





      (7) 
Equation （7） shows that under imperfect capital markets, for a given technology, the rate of returns to 
capital declines with capital investment.  
Baumol put forward a famous hypothesis (1959) predicting higher rates of return in enterprises 
requiring higher capital investment when barriers to entry are associated with capital availability. If the 
Baumol hypothesis holds, then we would expect to observe a positive relationship between the capital 
barriers to entry and the corresponding rate of returns to capital. For the Baumol hypothesis to hold, the 
underlying production technologies must meet certain conditions.  
According to equation (6), at the level of capital entry barrier, the rate of returns to capital is:  
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   （10） 
Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between technological choice and rate of returns to capital for a 
more general case of N different types of technology, if both equation (7) and the Baumol hypothesis 
(equation 9) hold. The zigzag lines show the rates of returns to capital for N types of production 
technologies. Suppose there is an integrated process to manufacture product TechN, which requires a high 
level of minimum investment,  N k .  















Note: The horizontal axis stands for a firm’s assets in logarithmic form, the vertical axis represents the rate of returns to capital, 
and r0 is the low interest rate provided to larger firms.  
Without a capital market, only investors with more than  N k  capital can afford to enter the 
business. In this case, only firms will have this kind of integrated production technology. The total profit 
is the area A below line TechN and between  N k  and k (the maximal available capital).  
Under a more realistic scenario, let us suppose that large firms can obtain credit from banks 
through collateral. Because their internal rates of returns to scale are higher than the borrowing cost, the 
large firms will expand their production with the potential to reach a point where the rate of returns to 
scale is equal to the interest rate, r0. With access to credit, these large firms will generate more profit, as 
shown in area B of the figure. Production is dominated by a few large firms and SMEs are largely 
suppressed. 
In the third case, suppose that the vertically-integrated production process, N, can be divided into 
N-1 small steps through organizational innovations, such as the putting-out system or subcontracting. The 
capital barriers for these incremental steps range from a low  1 k  to  1  N k , all of which are lower than those 
for the integrated production process as a whole. Any entrepreneurs with financial resources greater than 
1 k  can invest in Tech1. Individuals with resources exceeding the minimum capital requirement of Tech2 
r0 
k
Tech(N-1)  Tech(N) Tech4 Tech1 Tech2 Tech3
kmax
r 





are more likely to choose Tech2 instead of Tech1, although they have the option to invest in Tech1, 
because the lower entry barriers inherent in Tech1 intensify competition and lower the profit rate of Tech1. 
Following the same logic, investors with resources from  3 k  to  1  N k will tend to select production types 
from Tech3 to TechN-1, respectively. In summary, if a production technology is divisible and credit 
constraints are present, entrepreneurs are more likely to select vertically-divisible production 
technologies. The traditional putting-out system, subcontracting and clustering are several examples that 
make the vertical division of labor possible. The finer division of labor enables more entrepreneurs to 
participate in the production process, thereby generating more profit, as marked by area C in the figure.  
In reality, credit constraints for SMEs and credit support to large firms may go hand in hand. The 
formal banking sector is generally willing to extend credit to large firms (Freedman and Click, 2006). In 
this case, the profit curve will extend all the way down to point kmax, where the rate of returns to scale 
equals the borrowing cost. In such a case, we should observe an inverted-U-shaped relationship for data 
encompassing both small and large firms.  
Our theoretical model therefore yields two testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There is likely to be a positive correlation between capital barriers to entry and 
returns to capital when financial markets are less developed (Baumol hypothesis). If banks 
provide loans only to large firms with certain asset levels, the above relationship may exhibit an 
inverted-U shape.  
Hypothesis 2: After controlling for differences in entry barriers among different types of 
production technologies, the marginal rate of returns to capital declines with capital investment.  
If financial markets are perfect, we would expect to observe equal rates of return 
regardless of investment level. In other words, the correlation between r and k will be close to 
zero. Therefore, an empirical test of the above two hypotheses will also reveal the degree of 
financial market development.  
Finally, this paper will also contribute to the debate on firm size and returns to capital. Inspired 
by Baumol’s seminal work, numerous studies examine this relationship. In general, the empirical findings 
are mixed. Using data from Fortune Magazine’s “Directories of 500 largest Industrial Corporations,” Hall 
and Weiss (1967) find large firms have higher profit rates, as Baumol proposed. Using larger samples and 
controlling for market share and concentration, however, Shepherd (1972) and Amato and Wilder (1985) 
find no relationship between firm size and profit rate. Dhawan (2001) finds that small firms are 
significantly more productive but also more risky than their larger counterparts in the US industrial sector. 
Because different industries may follow different business cycles, it is hard to test Baumol’s hypotheses 
using aggregate data from many industries. Moreover, most of the empirical studies mentioned above 
exclude small firms due to lack of data. The present paper addresses this issue by using primary survey 




3.  A NARRATIVE OF THE PUYUAN CASHMERE SWEATER CLUSTER 
Brief History of the Puyuan Cluster 
Puyuan Township is located in northern Zhejiang Province, between Hangzhou and Shanghai. 
Historically, Puyuan was an important silk production center. In 1976, a collectively owned enterprise, 
the Puyuan Tanhua (Weaving) Production Cooperative, purchased three hand-loom weaving machines 
and began to produce cashmere sweaters. The gross output value of the cooperative soared from 28,000 
yuan to 300,000 yuan in just one year, prompting the group to devote all of its production capacity to 
cashmere sweaters by the end of 1977 (Chen, 1996). 
This firm’s huge success prompted farmers in nearby villages and workers from the township and 
village-owned enterprises to set up their own cashmere sweater production workshops. Meanwhile, 
market demand for clothes surged exponentially after the success of rural reform in the mid-1980s; this 
ever-increasing demand greatly stimulated production. Due to lack of savings, most entrepreneurs initially 
worked from home using a few secondhand weaving machines, and sold the sweaters along a main road 
linking Shanghai and Hangzhou. However, large crowds often gathered at these points of sale, blocking 
traffic. In April of 1988, the township government and the local administration for industry and 
commerce responded to this issue by raising 580,000 yuan from different sources and constructing a 
cashmere sweater marketplace. Located on the southern side of the main road, this marketplace initially 
comprised over 4,300 square meters of building area and more than 50 rooms. Both local merchants and 
those from other regions of Zhejiang Province quickly moved into the marketplace and began doing 
business. The openness of the marketplace deepened the division of labor, with merchants often putting-
out production to different workshops in Puyuan after receiving market orders. In 1990, the township 
produced over 2.8 million sweaters, and approximately 90% of the households in Puyuan Township and 
its peripheral villages were engaged in the production of cashmere sweaters. 
By 1992, the old marketplace had exceeded its capacity. Between 1992 and 1994, the local 
government further raised nearly 100 million yuan and built 11 more marketplaces with more than 3,000 
rooms for intermediate inputs and cashmere sweaters. Once again, the new marketplaces were very 
popular and quickly became filled with merchants from all around China. The establishment of standard 
markets for intermediate and final goods enabled small family workshops to easily access raw materials, 
intermediate inputs, and national markets. Easy market access also lowered the transportation and 
marketing costs. As a result, the majority of entrepreneurs chose to specialize in only one stage of 
production. Cashmere sweater production recorded an explosive growth in this period. As of 1994, 
Puyuan’s sweater production capacity reached as many as 10 million pieces with market sales exceeding 
2 billion yuan, making it the largest production center of cashmere sweaters in China.  
By the late 1990s, the large expansion of low-end cashmere sweaters had largely driven prices 
down. The profit margin for enterprises producing high-quality, brand name sweaters was much higher, 
but Puyuan had very few well-known local brands at that time. Thus in 2000, the local government set up 
an industrial park of 2,245 mu (1 mu=0.067 hectare) in an attempt to attract well-known cashmere sweater 
enterprises with famous brands from elsewhere in China. Due at least in part to preferable land, tax, and 
credit policies, the industrial park was quickly occupied to full capacity. In addition, the local government 
encouraged local enterprises with high growth potentials to settle in the park, expand their production, 
and establish their brands.  
As of 2007, over 4,000 enterprises and family workshops in the Puyuan Township were engaged 
in the production of a variety of cashmere sweaters, and the market boasted more than 6,000 sweater 
shops. Over 60,000 people worked in different stages of the cashmere sweater production in this cluster. 
The market transaction turnover topped 10 billion yuan and the business volume amounted to nearly 500 
million pieces.
1 Along with the rapid growth in production, the local population jumped from less than 
                                                      
1 Data source: Puyuan Administrative Committee of Marketplace. 10 
 
30,000 in 1992 to more than 130,000 in 2005; among the latter, over 90,000 were migrant workers 
(Tongxiang Statistical Bureau, 2007).  
Two Modes of Production Organization 
The Puyuan cashmere cluster includes two major modes of production: the putting-out system and the 
integrated factory system. In the following section, we briefly introduce the two systems.  
Putting-Out System.  
The putting-out system is a merchant-led production organization form that consists of virtual production 
coordinators (shortened as VPCs) and many independent workshops and small enterprises. Silk 
production systems adopted the putting-out system as early as the Ming and Qing dynasties. According to 
Puyuan Township History (Chen, 1996), silk merchants purchased raw materials and then contracted out 
the production to individual workshops at the time. Because the workshops usually did not have much 
capital, they normally did not purchase raw materials by themselves. Instead, their major source of 
income was processing fees. Although silk and sweater productions differ in their technical details, their 
organizational modes of production are similar. Typical cashmere sweater production includes 10 main 
steps, as shown in the upper part of Figure 4: purchasing yarn, computer-aided design (CAD), weaving, 
assembling, dyeing and finishing, buttoning, ironing, printing, packing, and sale.  
Figure 4. Two modes of production systems 
 






























In the putting-out system, although most of the production takes place in independent workshops, 
the VPCs play a key role in coordinating the production process. These VPCs either rent or own shops in 
the township’s designated sweater marketplaces. More often than not, they imitate designs from bigger 
companies or fashion magazines, create sample sweaters from these designs, and display the samples in 
their shops. As Puyuan is the largest cashmere sweater market in China, many merchants visit the shops 
in the marketplaces before putting in orders. When the VPCs receive orders or believe that a certain style 
will sell well, they purchase raw materials from the marketplace and have them delivered to family 
weaving workshops further down the production chain. The generated semi-finished goods are sent to 
dyeing, finishing, printing, and ironing enterprises, and the VPCs (merchants) perform quality inspections 
and package the final products in their shops. If any quality problems are identified, the VPC will trace it 
through the production steps and resolve the issue with the responsible party. 
The capital requirement for yarn dealers is high because they need a large amount of working 
capital for the yarns stocked in their shops. The Puyuan cluster comprises 250 yarn dealers, 5,700 sweater 
merchants, and over 4,000 production workshops. The local government has set up specific marketplaces 
for yarn and sweater merchants. Ironing workshops are concentrated in a designated area with access to 
centrally-provided gas. A few villages in the township have demolished scattered farmers’ houses and 
rebuilt them into more compact six-story townhouses. Usually, the workshops are located on the first and 
second floors of the farmers’ houses, the workers sleep on the third to fourth floors, and the local 
residents live on the top floors and collect rents from the workshops. Most workshops are within a three-
kilometer radius of the sweater marketplace.  
Integrated Factory System.  
The lower part in Figure 4 depicts the second business model, which has integrated enterprises at its core. 
These businesses design their own samples, purchase yarn from the yarn dealers in the marketplace or 
directly from yarn factories, and complete the weaving process in-house. They then typically outsource 
the semi-finished goods to specialized dyeing and finishing workshops/factories. After these steps, the 
products are returned to the integrated enterprise, where they are buttoned, ironed, sorted, printed, and 
packaged before being ultimately shipped out to the national market through the logistics center in 
Puyuan. Some enterprises may further outsource the ironing and printing stages.
2 Most of these integrated 
enterprises are located in the industrial park. 
It should be noted that yarn dealers and dyeing/finishing factories serve both putting-out and 
integrated factory systems as separate entities. Yarn dealers usually rent a shop in the yarn marketplace; 
the yarn shop requires only one or two people, but the business is rather capital intensive. Because its 
business model is similar to that of the sweater merchants, we include it as part of the putting-out system 
in our analysis. The dyeing and finishing factories, in contrast, usually have large buildings, employ a 
number of workers, and include many indivisible technical stages. Most of them are located in the 
industrial parks, together with the integrated factories. In the following analysis, we therefore regard them 
as an integrated factory.  
 
 
                                                      
2 Banerjee and Munshi (2004) define a firm as integrated if it includes more than one stage of production.  12 
 
4.  DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Since 2005, we have paid numerous visits to the cluster and kept in close contact with a number of key 
people in the industry, including officials at the Puyuan Administrative Committee of Marketplaces, as 
well as merchants, workshop owners and workers. Through conversation and observation, we have gained 
a deep understanding of both production systems. This greatly helps us obtain valuable information about 
various business activities when we conduct our surveys.  
Data Sources 
Our data come from two sources. The data on integrated firms in 2006 were obtained from the 
Administrative Committee of Puyuan Industrial Park (ACPIP). The enterprises in the industrial park are 
required to submit to the ACPIP accurate statistics on their fixed investments, numbers of workers, gross 
output values, profits and taxes. After we excluded seven enterprises that had just been set up in 2006 or 
lacked complete data, the sample comprised 118 enterprises, including 94 integrated factories and 24 
dyeing/finishing factories.  
In addition to this secondary data on the integrated firms in the industry park, we also conducted 
primary surveys in enterprises located outside the industry park in June and July of 2007. To make the 
sample more representative, we randomly selected the same number of VPCs from sections of 
marketplaces selling low-, middle- and high-end yarns and sweaters. The production of sweaters is 
scattered in villages surrounding the township center. Some villages have redesigned their residential and 
industrial areas to support the industry, while others have maintained the status quo. As a result, the rents 
of workshops differ between the two types of villages. We surveyed both types of villages to capture the 
difference. Table 1 presents the sampling framework, along with summary statistics of employment and 
capital stock. In total, we surveyed 200 merchants and workshop owners. After excluding 12 
questionnaires with incomplete answers, we were left with a sample comprising 188 questionnaires, 
including 58 yarn dealers, 62 sweater merchants, and 68 production workshops. Among the production 
workshops, the sample included 10 computer-aided designers, 14 weavers, 12 assemblers, 10 buttoners, 
11 printers, and 11 ironing workshops. We tried to survey at least 10 enterprises from each type of 
production.  
We made a concerted effort to obtain reliable labor force, capital stock and profit information. 
Because firms in the industrial park have certified formal accounting systems in place, the figures they 
provide to the administrative committee are relatively standardized. However, unlike the large factories in 
the industrial park, most merchants and workshop owners do not keep standard accounting books. 
Moreover, many of them were cautious about revealing sensitive information related to their business 
during the interview. Many refused to answer questions about profit and taxes. This posed a major 
challenge for our survey. Therefore, we adopted following measures to address the issue.  
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Table 1. Comparison of workers and capital stock between two production systems 
  
Total Sample 
   Number of workers in sample  Number 
of total 
workers 
  Capital stock (10,000 yuan)     Received 
bank 
loan (%)       Max Min  Mean    Max Min Mean   
Putting-out system                  
  Yarn dealers  250  58    3  1  2.14  535    176 39.6  92.23    58.62 
  Sweater shops (VPCs)  5,750  62    4  1  2.11  12,133    130 26  64.74    30.65 
  Computer-aided designers    20  10    2  1  1.8  36    18.62 8.92  12.98    10.00 
  Buttoning workshops  300  10    8  2.5  4.4  1,320    13.07 8.2  10.17    0.00 
  Ironing workshops  100  11    4  2.5  3.18  318    7.46 5.12  5.97    0.00 
  Assembling workshops   300  12    6.5  2  3.63  1088    11.38 4.58  6.93    8.33 
  Printing workshops  100  11    15  2  5  500    121.29 10.59  36.1    0.00 
  Weaving workshops  3,000  14    60  2  13.21  39,630    78.43 6.04  38.01    28.57 
Vertically-integrated system                          
  Dyeing & Finishing factories  60  24    155  16  59.46  3,567    6,937 100  1,442.46    90.91 
  Integrated producing factories  136  94     573  10  60.69  8,254    15,353 14  1,254.01      71.43 14 
 
Labor Force 
We herein define labor force as the total number of employees in an enterprise. In other words, an 
entrepreneur is treated as the same as a hired worker; if an entrepreneur hires a single worker into the 
business, we count the labor force as two. In reality, entrepreneurs usually work harder than workers. We 
will come back to this point later on, when we analyze the reasons behind the observed performance 
difference between the two types of production system. Some workshops hire workers only during the 
peak season, and maintain these workers for five to six months. Under this circumstance, we multiply the 
number of seasonal workers by a factor of 0.5.  
Capital Stock 
Because merchants do not have machinery, the calculation of their capital stock differs from that for 
family workshops. A merchant needs a shop and working capital to operate. We define the total capital 
stock as the sum of the present market value of their shop and their working capital. For family 
workshops, in addition to the value of shops and working capital, we also take the value of machinery into 
account. As merchants and workshops are clustered in designated areas, the market values of the shops 
and machinery are transparent and homogenous. In the survey, we asked for details on the timing and 
price of major machines purchases. Based on a published fixed asset price index and depreciation rate, we 
computed the present value of the machinery in 2006.
3  
Profit 
The profit data obtained from the ACPIP refers to net profit, which excludes wages and taxes. Not 
surprisingly, some enterprises reported negative net profits. For enterprises outside the industrial park, we 
had to compute the net profit. Firms’ wage costs were calculated by multiplying the total number of hired 
workers by the local wage level. In the cluster, the labor market is competitive and the wage range is 
narrow. Most workers are migrants, and they often exchange labor market information among themselves. 
Moreover, the marketplaces are rife with help-wanted advertisements that specify wages. If workers are 
underpaid in one workshop, they can switch to another, better-paying workshop at a low or negligible 
cost. By talking to workers and looking over the help-wanted postings in the marketplaces, we determined 
that a typical worker earned between 12,000 and 18,000 yuan per year, with 15,000 yuan as the median 
value. Accordingly, we multiplied the total number of workers by 15,000 yuan to obtain the total wage.  
In our preliminary survey, we found that most entrepreneurs did not want to reveal their net 
profits and taxes. However, they did not mind talking about the sales of their product. Therefore, we 
adopted an indirect method for determining profit in the final survey. First, we chatted with the merchants 
or workshop owners about the market situation of their products, such as whether they were targeting the 
high end or the mass market. Then, we asked the price of their products. Next, we shifted to other aspects 
of the questionnaire that were seemingly unrelated to profit. After we felt that the interviewees were more 
at ease, we asked them their total sales in 2006. At this stage, most of the entrepreneurs gave us definite 
answers. For the processing workshops, where the major revenues were processing fees based on a per-
piece rate, the workshop owners were general willing to tell us the piece rate and the total number of 
pieces finished in 2006. We could then use this information to calculate the total revenues. In addition, we 
also surveyed other major cost items, such as utilities, interest payments, and taxes. By deducting wages 
and other major costs from the calculated revenues, we were able to estimate the net profits.  
                                                      
3 Following Li (2003), we set 0.04 as the discount rate.  15 
 
Performance Comparison 
Scale of Operation 
The enterprises in the putting-out system are much smaller than the integrated firms in the industrial 
parks. Many of the yarn and sweater shops were run by husband and wife teams, some of whom hired one 
or two helpers. The raw materials and intermediate products were frequently transported from one 
processing point to another by a number of three-wheeler drivers. The designer shops were also small, 
usually comprising only one or two people, along with a computer, scanner, and printer. The weaving 
workshops were generally bigger than the other workshops, with an average of 13 workers. The 
assembling, buttoning, printing, and ironing workshops usually employed fewer than five people. In 
contrast, the enterprises in the industrial park were much bigger, averaging more than 60 workers. The 
Puyuan Administrative Committee of Marketplace provided us with the total number of enterprises by 
type. Based on the average sizes found in our sample, we were able to calculate the total number of 
workers by type in Puyuan (See Table 1 for details). In total, the putting-out system employed about 
55,000 workers while the integrated enterprises employed about 12,000 people.  
Profit 
Table 2 reports the rate of returns to scale and capital-labor ratio. The yarn dealers and sweater merchants 
had the highest capital-labor ratios, followed by the integrated enterprises in the industrial park, and then 
the production workshops in the putting-out system. The putting-out enterprises are typically more labor 
intensive than their vertically-integrated counterparts. Most SMEs hire family laborers. Some family 
members may work longer hours than hired workers, while other family members may work shorter hours 
so they can take care of family chores. Because we use imputed wages to compute profit, the accuracy of 
the wage data will affect the net profit. To check whether the estimated rate of returns to scale is sensitive 
to the working hours of family members, we calculated two rate of return sets (r1 and r2), assuming that 
family members worked the same hours as and 25% longer than hired workers, respectively. When 
assuming longer working hours, the rate of returns to scale drops from 0.32 to 0.25 for the enterprises in 
the putting-out system. In particular, the two most labor-intensive workshops (those engaged in ironing 
and assembling) had the most dramatic decline. With rather low capital requirement and easy entry, the 
profit rate margin for these two types of production is thin. Entrepreneurs often rely on extended working 
hours to make a profit. No matter whether r1 or r2 is used, the putting-out system exhibits a higher rate of 
returns to scale compared to the vertically-integrated firms. Among the enterprises in the putting-out 
system, the rate of return appears to be positively related to the capital-labor ratio.  
Table 2. Rate of returns to scale 
   r1 CV( r1) r2 CV( r2)  K/L
Putting-out system       
  Yarn dealers  0.32  0.34  0.31  0.36  44.11 
  Sweater shops (VPCs)  0.38  0.54  0.36  0.57  31.18 
  Computer-aided designers    0.46  0.61  0.39  0.68  7.81 
    Buttoning  workshops  0.31 0.64 0.22 0.86 2.59 
    Ironing  workshops  0.31 0.72 0.18 1.36 1.91 
    Assembling  workshops    0.24 1.55 0.08 6.75 2.03 
    Printing  workshops  0.25 0.96 0.22 1.15 7.18 
    Weaving  workshops  0.26 0.83 0.24 0.93 7.44 
  Average  0.32  0.64  0.25  0.76  13.03 
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Table 2. Continued 
   r1 CV( r1) r2 CV( r2)  K/L
Vertically-integrated system           
  Dyeing & Finishing factories  0.13  1.48  0.13  1.49  25.53 
  Integrated producing factories  0.06  2.59  0.06  2.64  24.1 
  Average  0.09  2.43  0.09  2.47  24.82 
Data source: Authors’ survey, Puyuan Administrative Committee of Industrial Park, and the Puyuan Administrative Committee 
of Marketplace. 
Note: For r1, we assume family members work as long as hired workers. For r2, we assume that family members work 25% 
longer than hired workers, meaning that their imputed wage is 25% higher.  
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5.  HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The Existence of Credit Bias against SMEs 
One key assumption underlying the two hypotheses is that SMEs have more difficulty accessing bank 
credit compared to their larger counterparts. Many empirical works lend support to this assumption. For 
example, Yang (2002) finds that the rejection rate of loan applications for firms with less than 51 
employees is as high as 78.92%, while it is only 24.34% for firms with more than 500 employees. A study 
undertaken by the Township and the Village Enterprise Bureau of Ministry of Agriculture (2002) revealed 
that 86.5% of firms with fixed assets less than five million yuan reported having difficulty acquiring 
loans. A report by the Township and Village Enterprise Bureau of Ankang City (2006) indicates that 
China Bank of Industry and Commerce (CBIC) requires a firm to have a minimum asset level of 10 
million yuan to qualify for credit, and loans of less than 1 million yuan to new customers are not 
considered. In general, the CBIC classifies SMEs into three types: medium, small and micro firms. Firms 
with assets of less than 2 million yuan are defined as micro firms. In principle, the bank discourages 
extending loans to the micro firms.
4 In its lending guidelines, the Bank of China (1998) has explicit 
regulations that limit credit to SMEs. The China Agricultural Bank requires that firms provide at least 
three years of financial reports when applying for a loan.
5 Because many SMEs are relatively new and do 
not have a formal financial reporting system, they are naturally excluded by this requirement.  
Prior to 2004, Puyuan had branches of only the abovementioned state banks. In March of 2004, 
Jiaxing Commercial Bank, a locally-owned shareholding company, set up a branch office in Tongxiang 
City, about 20 kilometers from Puyuan Township. In 2005, the first pawnshop opened in Puyuan 
Township. The last column in Table 1 shows the proportion of enterprises that have received bank loans. 
It is apparent from the table that production types requiring a higher level of investment are more likely to 
receive bank credit compared to those with lower entry costs. For example, none of the buttoning and 
ironing workshops had acquired bank loans, which could be interpreted in two ways: either they did not 
have access to credit, or they did not need outside credit. In contrast, most firms in the Puyuan industrial 
park, which were bigger and owned factory buildings and other assets, had access to formal credit. 
This finding is consistent with prior reports in the academic literature (Lin and Li, 2001). The 
lending guidelines mean that in the absence of fixed assets as collateral, SMEs receive limited credit 
support from state banks in China. This obviously favors the extension of credit to large firms. However, 
the lack of credit to SMEs in the cluster may also suggest that these workshops do not need external credit 
due to their low entry costs. Unfortunately, our data cannot distinguish between these two possibilities. 
Nonetheless, the table suggests that there is a positive correlation between access to credit and the level of 
capital investment. 
Testing the Two Hypotheses 
Having documented the existence of credit constraints for SMEs and more favorable lending policies for 
large firms, we next use both parametric and non-parametric methods to test the two hypotheses put 
forward in the second section. Figure 5 plots the rate of returns to scale (r1) against assets in logarithmic 
form (k) with a 95% confidence interval. The band in the segment of higher returns does not appear to be 
wider than that of lower returns, suggesting that higher rates of returns are not necessarily associated with 
higher risks. Also, as shown in Table 2, the coefficient of variation (CV) among the enterprises in the 
putting-out system is generally smaller than that for the vertically-integrated factories. In general, the 
smaller firms are not necessarily more risky than their larger counterparts.  
Figure 5 shows that there is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the two variables. For the 
first segment of the curve, the rate of return is positively associated with the asset level. The relationship 
                                                      
4 “The CBIB Lending Guidelines to SMEs” is from http://www.zhangye.gov.cn/qybszn/rdzcjd/200709/50628.html.  
5 “The Agricultural Bank Lending Guidelines” can be found at http://www.smeyndl.gov.cn/readnews.asp?newsid=212. 
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becomes negative after the firm’s assets reach a certain size. This nonparametric graph seems to support 
our first hypothesis. To more rigorously test the two hypotheses further, we use the following 
econometric specifications:  
           X k k c r
2
 (11) 
where r stands for the rate of returns to scale, c is an intercept, k is firm’s asset level in logarithmic form, 
k
2 is a quadratic term of k, X is a set of control variables for different types of production, and ε is an error 
term. We use either the minimum capital requirement in each type of production or a set of dummy 
variables for production types as control variables, and α, β, and γ are the corresponding coefficients for k, 
k
2 and X, respectively.  
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For the first hypothesis to hold, we expect β to be significant and negative when X is excluded. 
The second hypothesis indicates that α should be significantly negative and β to be insignificant if X is 
included. Table 3 reports the estimation results under various specifications when the dependent variable 
is r1. For the first six regressions, R1-R6, we use our survey sample without taking sampling weights into 
account. The second set of six regressions, R7-R12, uses the inverse probability of sample selection as 
weights. In regressions R1 and R7, only the capital variable is included as an independent variable. The 
coefficient for this variable is negative in both regressions, and it is significant in R1 but not in R7. When 
the quadratic term is added, the coefficient for k
2 become significantly negative in R2, strongly supporting 
the first hypothesis of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the capital entry barrier and the rate of 
returns to capital. Although the coefficient for the quadratic term is negative, it is insignificant in R8 
when weights are considered, lending only weak support to the first hypothesis.  19 
 
Table 3. Regression results with dependent variable r1 
        Without weights                With weights       
   R1 R2 R3  R4 R5 R6    R7 R8  R9  R10  R11 R12 
k -0.061  0.052  -0.027  -0.073  -0.210  -0.095    -0.023  0.089 -0.029  -0.076 -0.126 -0.093 
 (3.18)**  (1.29)  (0.34)  (7.33)***  (2.00)*  (6.56)***    (1.20)  (0.78)  (0.33) (5.64)***  (1.24) (14.87)*** 
k
2    -0.011  -0.004   0.011       -0.015  -0.006   0.005  
    (3.01)***  (0.62)   (1.28)       (1.30)  (0.57)   (0.31)  
Minimum  k     0.060  0.072          0.118  0.122     
    (2.33)**  (2.63)**          (11.66)***  (7.81)***     
  Yarn dealers          0.456  0.335            0.341  0.330 
       (3.44)***  (9.05)***          (14.76)***  (20.64)*** 
  Sweater shops (VPCs)          0.507  0.397            0.406  0.393 
       (4.29)***  (12.71)***          (13.85)***  (29.14)*** 
  Computer-aided designers          0.39  0.349            0.355  0.347 
       (9.33)***  (39.05)***          (15.97)***  (90.17)*** 
  Buttoning workshops          0.160  0.131            0.137  0.131 
       (5.61)***  (22.47)***          (8.22)***  (51.74)*** 
  Ironing workshops          0.061  0.071            0.069  0.071 
       (6.53)***  (37.52)***          (12.20)***  (87.28)*** 
  Printing workshops          0.260  0.186            0.194  0.183 
       (3.35)***  (9.75)***          (7.15)***  (22.26)*** 
  Weaving workshops          0.293  0.216            0.223  0.213 
       (3.60)***  (10.50)***          (8.89)***  (24.00)*** 
  Dyeing & Finishing factories         0.516  0.416            0.37  0.406 
       (3.35)***  (5.81)***          (2.47)**  (13.13)*** 
  Integrated producing factories          0.459  0.367            0.33  0.358 
       (3.34)***  (5.93)***          (2.73)**  (13.42)*** 
Constant  0.559 0.317  0.335 0.405 0.575  0.394    0.441  0.244 0.233  0.308 0.437  0.39 
    (5.55)*** (3.09)*** (1.85)*  (4.34)*** (3.39)*** (14.27)***   (5.76)***  (0.93)  (1.25) (4.44)*** (3.14)**  (32.75)*** 
Observations  306  306  306  306  306 306    306  306 306  306 306 306 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.120 0.132  0.142 0.144 0.170 0.167    0.005  0.015 0.098  0.099 0.103 0.105 
AIC  132.972 129.495  126.936 125.532 104.857  104.787    -8.094  -10.208 -36.02  -37.326 -49.99  -51.806 
Omitted variable test  0.001  0.007  0.268  0.119  0.255  0.183     0.044  0.082  0.02 0.147  0.008  0.055 
Note: k is capital stock in logarithmic form. Clustered robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.20 
 
In regressions R3 and R9, we further add the minimum capital requirement at each stage of 
production in logarithmic form, as taken from Table 1. The new variable has a significantly positive 
coefficient, suggesting that rates of return are positively associated with the capital barriers to entry. The 
coefficient for the quadratic term of k is insignificant. In regressions R4 and R10, in which the quadratic 
term of k is dropped, the coefficient for k becomes significant and negative, showing that after we control 
for the minimum capital requirement of entry, capital has a diminishing margin. This result is consistent 
with the second hypothesis. In regressions R5 and R6 (R11 and R12), we replace the minimum capital 
requirement with a set of dummy variables for production types, in order to capture the potential 
difference in technologies; from this we obtain similar results (the coefficient for k is negative). Figure 6 
plots the coefficients for the dummy variables against the minimum capital requirement by production 
type. It is clear that there is a strong positive correlation, as suggested by our theoretical model. The 
observed initial increase in the rate of return may be mainly due to the existence of credit constraints for 
SMEs. In general, the regressions that include control variables have smaller Akaike information 
criterion(AIC) than those without controls, suggesting that the latter models provide a better description 
of the underlying data-generating process.  



















Note: The vertical axis represents the coefficient for dummy variables in regression 5 of Table 2. The horizontal axis is the 
minimum capital in each stage of production, as shown in Table 1 in logarithmic form. The default dummy variable is for the 
assembling workshops and the corresponding coefficient is set to zero in the figure. 
To further check whether the regression results are robust to the rate of returns that are imputed 
based on longer working hours for family members, Table 4 repeats the regressions in Table 3, replacing 
the dependent variable r1 with r2. All the findings still hold. Once again, an inverted-U-shaped 
relationship is observed in the absence of control variables. After the control variables for entry barriers 
are included, the quadratic term becomes insignificant, and only a negative relationship between the rate 
of returns to scale and capital stock is observed. 21 
 
Table 4. Regression results with dependent variable r2 
        Without weights                With weights       
   R1 R2 R3  R4 R5 R6    R1  R2  R3  R4 R5  R6 
k -0.044  0.140  0.057  -0.060  -0.159  -0.088   0.015  0.200  0.084 -0.040  -0.011  -0.056 
  (1.80) (3.31)***  (0.62) (5.12)***  (1.31) (5.30)***   (0.64)  (1.73)*  (0.93)  (2.11)*  (0.12) (3.56)*** 
k
2    -0.018  -0.011   0.007       -0.025  -0.016   -0.006  
    (4.60)***  (1.37)   (0.68)       (2.11)**  (1.50)   (0.44)  
Minimum  k      0.063  0.093           0.116  0.127    
    (2.21)*  (2.65)**           (10.66)***  (5.10)***     
  Yarn dealers          0.542  0.468            0.372  0.387 
       (3.58)***  (11.05)***           (21.58)***  (9.61)*** 
  Sweater shops (VPCs)          0.593  0.526            0.44  0.457 
       (4.39)***  (14.73)***           (20.01)***  (13.48)*** 
  Computer-aided designers          0.459  0.433            0.402  0.413 
       (9.55)***  (42.45)***           (21.05)***  (42.66)*** 
  Buttoning workshops          0.217  0.199            0.178  0.186 
       (6.61)***  (29.78)***           (12.34)***  (29.33)*** 
  Ironing workshops          0.096  0.102            0.109  0.106 
       (8.96)***  (47.56)***           (22.12)***  (52.07)*** 
  Printing workshops          0.338  0.293            0.236  0.251 
       (3.81)***  (13.45)***           (10.88)***  (12.14)*** 
  Weaving workshops          0.367  0.32            0.261  0.275 
       (3.94)***  (13.61)***           (13.27)***  (12.31)*** 
  Dyeing & Finishing factories          0.604 0.542            0.433 0.386 
       (3.48)***  (6.63)***           (2.72)**  (4.96)*** 
  Integrated producing factories          0.55  0.494            0.396  0.359 
       (3.55)***  (6.99)***           (3.05)**  (5.35)*** 
Constant 0.451  0.056  0.075  0.251  0.328  0.217   0.262  -0.064  -0.074  0.124  0.093  0.157 
    (3.52)***  (0.52)  (0.35) (1.96)*  (1.68) (6.88)***    (2.63)**  (0.24) (0.38)  (1.46) (0.74)  (5.23)*** 
Observations  306  306  306  306  306 306    306  306 306  306 306 306 
Adjusted R-squared  0.061  0.100  0.111  0.103  0.154 0.155    0.000  0.033 0.112  0.100 0.122 0.124 
AIC 148.29  136.299  133.435  135.146  106.116  104.849    -0.699  -9.858 -34.911  -32.076 -50.788 -52.455 
Omitted variable test  0  0.007  0.048  0.107  0.024  0.164      0.003  0.036 0.297  0.007 0.002 0.032 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The traditional putting-out system has been generally regarded as a transitional stage during Western 
Europe’s Industrial Revolution. Recently, however, industrial clustering has reemerged to prominence in 
both developed and developing countries. Strictly speaking, the subcontracting commonly seen in 
industrial clusters is a modern variant of the traditional putting-out system. Marshall (1920) argues that 
clustering helps promote industrial development in three ways: by improving the flow of market and 
technology information, by improving linkages between suppliers and clients, and by pooling labor. 
Porter (1990) goes one step further by proposing that clustering is a key way to improve competitiveness. 
Ruan and Zhang (2008) show that industrial clustering plays an additional role in lowering capital barriers 
to entry, which in turn attracts more potential entrepreneurs to industrial activities. 
In terms of firm performance, we observe that for each type of production, the law of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital still holds. This is particularly true for the larger integrated enterprises, which 
have easier access to bank credit. However, the rate of returns at the point of entry to a certain production 
type is positively correlated with its minimum level of capital requirement. This suggests that many small 
enterprises in the putting-out system make technological choices based on their own available financial 
resources. Despite the credit constraints, many entrepreneurs can still participate in the production 
process, largely because clustering provides a wider menu of choices.  
In this case study, we further show that the putting-out system in industrial clusters can also help 
tap the entrepreneurial talents that are scattered in rural areas, thus making better use of capital. As in 
many developing countries, at the time of economic reform in the late 1970s, China’s comparative 
advantage was marked by abundant labor and scarce capital. Facing a less-developed financial market, 
entrepreneurs and local governments in many parts of coastal China chose clustering as a more favorable 
mode of production than the use of integrated factories. Production was organized within clusters 
according to the traditional putting-out system and its modern variants. As a result, both capital and 
entrepreneurial talents were more efficiently utilized over the course of China’s rural industrialization.  
Further studies are needed to examine where clustering is most likely to occur. At least from 
casual observation, population density seems to be a key factor in the emergence of clusters. 
Subcontracting and clustering are more popular in Japan and Italy than in the US, perhaps due to the high 
population density in the former countries. The same pattern holds true within China. Let us take two 
provinces in China as an example. Inner Mongolia is one of the least populated provinces in China, with 
only about 20 people per square kilometer. There, individuals have stayed close to the source of wool 
production, and a number of large, integrated cashmere sweater enterprises have emerged. In contrast, the 
population density in Zhejiang Province is as high as 481 people per square kilometer. Although Zhejiang 
does not produce wool and is located thousands of kilometers away from the major sources of input in the 
north, through clustering it has become one of leading production centers of cashmere sweaters. Due at 
least in part to deepening divisions of labor, the firm size in Puyuan (within Zhejiang Province) is much 
smaller than that seen in Inner Mongolia.  
As shown by Long and Zhang (2008), clustering has been a major feature of China’s rural 
industrialization over the past three decades, suggesting that the Zhejiang model may not be a unique 
phenomenon. This business model of separate producing units vertically linking the stages of production 
not only helps overcome the difficulties of capital and legal constraints, it also fits well with the 
comparative advantage of most developing countries- i.e. relatively abundant labor and limited capital. 
Despite its widespread practice in developing countries, however, there are relatively few empirical 
studies comparing the role of clustering with that of vertically-integrated mass production in the course of 
industrialization. This study on the putting-out system in industrial clusters in Zhejiang Province may 
shed some light on the applicability of this business model in other developing countries when credit 
constraints are a major problem.  
It is worth emphasizing that we are not arguing that a well-functioning financial system is 
unimportant or that its absence will not at some point hinder economic growth. Rather, our argument is a 23 
 
much milder one. We find that the lack of formal, “first-best” institutions does not necessarily preclude a 
nation’s economic development, as long as appropriate alternative mechanisms can be developed (or 
chosen) in response to the initial conditions of the economy. When studying the early stages of 
industrialization, it is important to examine organizational choices of production in addition to financial 
development.  24 
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